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Abstract
This paper reports on a laboratory experiment which investigates the impact of in-
stitutions and institutional choice in constant-sum sender-receiver games. We compare
individual sender and receiver behavior in two different institutions: A sanction-free in-
stitution which is given by the bare sender-receiver game and a sanctioning institution
which in addition offers the receiver the opportunity to (costly) sanction the sender after
receiving feedback on the senders private information. We conduct the experiment in two
phases: First, individuals are randomly assigned to an institution, and second they can
choose the institution themselves.
We find that sanctioning takes place predominantly after the receiver has trusted a lie
by the sender. Those who are responsible for sanctioning are also responsible for truth-
telling in excess with respect to models of rational payoff-maximizing agents. Thereby, the
sanctioning institution exhibits more truth-telling. Most importantly, agents who sanction
reveal preference for the sanctioning institution while the other subjects almost exclusively
opt for the sanction-free institution. As a consequence, both institutions typically coexist
in the second phase of the experiment and the sanctioning institution exhibits a higher
level of truth-telling and lower aggregate material payoffs.
To offer an explanation of our experimental findings, we formalize preferences for
truth-telling as psychological payoffs and analyze the sender-receiver game as a dynamic
psychological game a` la Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2006). We demonstrate that stan-
dard models of social preferences are not able to explain observed sanctioning behavior
and excessive truth-telling. Explicit psychological costs of lying and the exposition to a
lie, however, are able to fill this gap. To this end, we model deontological and consequen-
tialistic preferences for truth-telling and evaluate their respective explanatory power.
JEL Classification: A13, C72, Z13.
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1 Introduction
Everyone faces the decision to tell the truth or to lie to someone else at countless occasions,
ranging from social contexts (“Did you like my nephew’s performance as a solo-soprano in the
boy’s choir?”) to economic settings (“Shall I reveal the potential pitfalls of this investment
project?”). As diverse as the possible answers to these questions, are the various reflections
upon the concept of “truth” in the history of philosophical thought. Following a deontological
concept, some scholars view truth as an indispensable duty of mankind.1 This perspective
is contested by consequentialists who regard the decision to tell the truth as the result of
a maximization of individual or societal welfare.2 In short, a deontological perspective puts
more emphasis on the means than on the goals while the reversed holds for consequentialists.3
These different views on truth-telling are, however, not only a feature of discussions among
philosophical scholars, but represent an ostinato of recent discussions on truth-telling to
medical patients,4 whistle-blowing programs for government officials,5 or the debate on work
ethics for managers (see e.g. The Economist (2007)).
But there is not only heterogeneity of individuals and philosophical systems if it comes to
an attitude or appreciation of truth-telling. We can also observe a high degree of heterogeneity
if we look at the way real life institutions (contracts, trade rules, or social norms etc.) actually
enforce truth-telling. As an example consider, for instance, the various arrangements with
which sports clubs want to induce truthful reports on the usage of sporting facilities by their
members. Some clubs use costly monitoring or electronic registration techniques together
with a menu of sanctioning opportunities for misbehavior, while other clubs just rely on their
member’s compliance. In a similar way, corporate cultures differ in the implementation of
truthful reports by a CEO to the board of governors (see e.g. Frey and Jegen (2001)). While
some firms use incentive contracts to establish truth-telling as a payoff-maximizing strategy
for the CEO, other firms rely on the intrinsic motivation or the reputation-based development
1This view is shared by most religious ethical systems. The most pronounced exposition in philosophy is
perhaps given by Immanuel Kant’s categorial imperative (see Kant (1999, p.45)) according to which everyone
should act in such a way that he also wants his actions to become a universal law (“Handle nur nach derjenigen
Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst dass sie ein allgemeines Gesetz werde.”). This idea has been
applied by by the linguist Paul Grice who formulates a (descriptive) cooperation principle of communication
(see Grice (1975)) according to which everyone contributes to “talk-exchange” in an expected way. Grice
thereby emphasizes the importance of truth-telling as an essential tool to make communication feasible.
2The most prominent representatives of this perspective are utilitarians starting with Joseph Priestley and
Jeremy Bentham. A pronounced presentation of this view can be found in Bentham (1996, ch.1) “... the
greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation”. For an example for a
modern theory of philosophical thought that picks up on this view see e.g. Nyberg (1993). An extreme form
of consequentialism is clearly represented by the homo economicus who’s only goal is the maximization of
individual profit—regardless of the means or the well-being of others.
3Of course, there is no such dichotomy of philosophical schools in this respect. E.g., Grice’s work—though
of deontological flavor—clearly pursues an important goal also familiar to consequentialists: The feasibility of
communication.
4See, for instance, http://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/topics/truth.html.
5See, for instance, http://www.truthtellingproject.org.
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of “conventions” within the profession. Other (economic) examples range from tax compliance
to markets with incomplete information about product characteristics and to contracts for
delegated expertise (with e.g., lawyers, doctors, financial advisors, or external auditors).
Our experiment analyzes constant-sum sender-receiver games and thereby tries to capture
the feature of strategic information transmission inherent to all these applications. We inves-
tigate how truth-telling is influenced by institutional details (i.e., sanctioning opportunities)
and institutional choice. In particular, we ask in how far truth-telling in a constant-sum
sender-receiver game can be interpreted as a social norm which deserves enforcement through
costly sanctions and whether self-selection of individuals into institutions creates sub-societies
of distinct properties (i.e., aggregate payoffs and norm-compliance through truth-telling).
The game played throughout the experiment is a sender-receiver game with two types of
senders (each type being equally likely). Senders submit a (not necessarily truthful) message
about their type to a receiver. If the receiver’s action matches with the sender’s type, the
receiver gets a payoff of five and the sender a payoff of one; in case of a mismatch, the
payoffs are opposite. Hence, the game is constant-sum, sender’s and receiver’s payoffs are
antagonistic, and messages have no influence on the players’ payoffs (cheap-talk).
For our experiment, we adopt a two-by-two within-subjects design. Firstly, we have
two kinds of institutions. In the sanction-free institution individuals just play the sender-
receiver game—being randomly assigned the role of sender and receiver, respectively. In the
sanctioning institution, after having played the game and having observed the true type of
the sender, the receiver is given the option to costly sanction the sender by reducing both
payoffs to zero. Secondly, there are two phases. In the random assignment phase, which is
the first phase, subjects are randomly assigned to an institution. In the following selection
phase, subjects can select the institution (before knowing whether to play the role of sender
or receiver).
Standard theory with rational, payoff-maximizing agents predicts that no information
transmission takes place in any sequential equilibrium of the sender-receiver game (see Craw-
ford and Sobel (1982)). That is, senders report the true state (i.e. tell the truth) half of the
time and receivers believe in their reports (i.e. trust) half of the time.6 Moreover, a receiver
will never choose to sanction the sender if this reduces his own material payoff ex post (which
is the case in our setting). Hence, senders and receivers would prefer to be in an institution
without such a sanctioning opportunity.7
Sender-receiver games have been investigated in a few recent laboratory studies. Dickhaut
et al. (1995) demonstrate that information transmission decreases in the degree of conflict
6Throughout the paper we will refer to a report by the sender that reveals the true type as truth-telling
and a choice by the receiver that coincides with the sender’s report as trust.
7Strictly speaking, players weakly prefer the sanction-free institution if they anticipate sequential equilibrium
behavior. The expectation of some “accidental” sanctioning, however, would lead to a strict superiority of the
sanction-free institution.
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between sender and receiver in line with Crawford and Sobel (1982)’s predictions. However,
experiments by Cai and Wang (2006) show that, on the aggregate level, senders overcom-
municate in the sense that they reveal more private information than what standard theory
predicts. A laboratory study by Gneezy (2005) indicates that the probability of lying is
increasing in the potential gains from deception to the sender and decreasing in the poten-
tial losses to the receiver. Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz (forthcoming) investigate the relation
between excess truth-telling and the willingness to (costly) sanction lies on the individual
level. They show that those who sanction as receivers—in particular after they trusted a
sender who deceived them—tell the truth excessively and are responsible for almost all excess
truth-telling on the aggregate level. Our design allows us to extend this result by relating
sanctioning behavior in the sanctioning institution to truth-telling and trust in the sanction-
free institution.
From the relatively young but growing literature on institutional selection, the recent
paper by Guererk et al. (2006) seems closest to our contribution. In their experiment, indi-
viduals choose between a sanctioning and a non-sanctioning institution to play a public good
game. They find that a small number of individuals who prefer to contribute and to (costly)
sanction free-riders—and therefore choose the sanctioning institution—is sufficient to estab-
lish higher aggregate payoffs in the sanctioning institution thereby attracting successively all
participants. Hence, it is the higher material payoff which establishes the sanctioning institu-
tion as sole “winner” of institutional competition. However, it is not clear that in our setting
the sanctioning institution will be as successful, since the joint material payoff can at best be
as high as in the sanction-free institution.
In our experiment, we observe excessive truth-telling and trust compared to predictions by
standard theory, and identify sanctioners as individuals who sanction after they have trusted
a lie. We find that sanctioners are mainly responsible for excessive truth-telling in both and
for excessive trust in the sanction-free institution (i.e., if we withdraw the sanctioners from
our data, individuals tell the truth and trust on average in half of the cases as predicted by
sequential equilibrium behavior). With respect to the institutional choice in the selection
phase, we observe that sanctioners predominately choose the sanctioning institution while
the vast majority of other subjects opts for the sanction-free institution. Both institutions
typically coexist in the selection phase, and the sanctioning institution exhibits more truth-
telling and trust. As we observe sanctions in the sanctioning institution throughout the
selection phase, one can conclude that there are individuals (sanctioners) who deliberately
choose an institution with lower material payoffs but a higher level of truth-telling (and trust).
Hence, the members of our experimental society self-select themselves into sub-societies of
distinct economic performance (i.e., payoff generation) and (normative) behavior (i.e., truth-
telling).
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Our findings offer several implications. First, the robust observation of excess truth-telling
(in line with previous studies) suggests that truth-telling is easier to implement than indicated
by models with rational, payoff-maximizing agents. In particular, details of institutional
design (such as opportunities for costly sanctions) that are irrelevant in these models have a
systematic impact on individual behavior and aggregate institutional performance.
Second, sequential equilibrium (assuming rational, payoff-maximizing agents) fails to ex-
plain the behavior of sanctioners and the choice for and performance of the sanctioning
institution. We demonstrate that models of distributional preferences (such as e.g., inequity
version) can only provide a partial explanation of these observations. While these models
are able to motivate the observation of sanctioning, they are unable to explain significantly
different sanctioning rates after a sender trusted a lie and after he did not trust the truth
(both histories leading to the same payoff distribution). Towards a better understanding of
actual behavior, we investigate the explanatory power of deontological and consequentialistic
preferences for truth-telling. In the deontological model, we assign psychological costs to lies
(and benefits to truth-telling) regardless of the consequences while in the consequentialistic
model, we restrict costs from lying and benefits from telling the truth to situations where the
sender believes the receiver to trust him in more than half of the cases (i.e., psychological costs
are not independent of the consequences and depend on beliefs). The deontological model
proves to be a fruitful shortcut to explain the history-dependence of sanctioning behavior, but
fails to describe actual excessive truth-telling on the individual level. The consequentialistic
model in turn is rich enough to give a coherent explanation of our experimental findings.
Third, if institutional choice is endogenized, individuals self-select into sub-societies with
distinct aggregate payoffs and levels of truth-telling and trust. In particular, self-selection
leads to societies that are accurately described by standard theory next to societies that re-
quire a more complex modelling (e.g., explicit preferences for truth-telling) for a coherent
explanation. Hence, our experiment does not only demonstrate stable institutional diver-
sity, but also emphasizes the impact of self-selection on accurate descriptions of truth-telling
decisions by economic models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the exper-
imental setting, design and procedures. Section 3 lists all results. In Section 4, we provide
intuitions, implications and explanations. Section 5 concludes. The theoretical analysis and
the instruction of the experiment are relegated to the Appendices.
2 Experimental set-up
2.1 Setting
We consider a sender-receiver game with payoffs as depicted in Figure 1. In this game, there
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action A action B
1 ; 5 5 ; 1
type A
action A action B
5 ; 1 1 ; 5
type B
Figure 1: Sender-receiver game.
are two players: the sender and the receiver. The sender is either of type A or of type B. The
actual type is chosen by nature and it is only known to the sender. It is common knowledge
that nature selects each type with equal probability. The receiver decides whether to take
action A or to take action B. In case the action matches with the type, the receiver gets a
payoff of 5 and leaves the sender with a payoff of 1. Payoffs are reversed in case the action
does not match with the type.
Before the receiver has to decide upon the action to take, but after the sender has learnt
her type, the sender sends one of the following two messages to the receiver: message A (“the
type selected by nature is type A”) and message B (“the type selected by nature is type B”).
Throughout this paper we say that the sender tells the ‘truth’ if her message matches with
her type, otherwise we say she tells a ‘lie’. Moreover, we say that the receiver does ‘trust’ the
message if his action matches with the message received, otherwise we say he does ‘distrust’
the message.8 Hence, the combinations truth–trust and lie–distrust lead to a payoff of 5 to
the receiver and only 1 to the sender and the combinations truth–distrust and lie–trust lead
to the reversed payoffs.
We consider this game in two different institutions, the sanction-free institution and the
sanctioning institution. In the sanction-free institution, the sender and the receiver just play
the sender-receiver game presented above. In the sanctioning institution, the receiver has
additionally the option to sanction after the sender-receiver game has been played and after
he has observed the real type of the sender. If the receiver sanctions, both players’ payoffs
are reduced to zero, otherwise the payoffs remain unchanged.
2.2 Design and procedures
The experiment was conducted with the help of the z-Tree toolbox (Fischbacher (2007)) in the
experimental computer laboratory at Maastricht University in October and November 2006.
All students of the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration were invited via email
to register for the experiment. In total, we had 8 sessions with 20 subjects. Subjects received
written and context-free instructions (see Appendix B) that they could study at their own
pace. Eventual clarifying questions were dealt with privately. Before the experiment started,
every subject had to answer some control questions correctly (see Appendix B).
8Note that we use ‘truth’, ‘lie’, ‘trust’, and ‘distrust’ as mere labels of (combinations of) actions that allow
for a reduced form representation of the game (see Appendix A). A connection to the respective philosophical
concepts is discussed in Section 4.
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We conducted the experiment in two phases. The first phase is referred to as random
assignment phase and it lasts 60 rounds. In each round, the 20 subjects are randomly divided
in such a way that 6 subjects are assigned to the sanction-free institution and the remaining
14 are assigned to the sanctioning institution. Next, each subject is randomly matched to
another subject within the same institution to form a pair. Within each pair, one subject is
randomly chosen to be the sender, the other subject is the receiver. After all subjects are
informed about the institution assigned to and the their role, the respective game is played.
The second phase of each session is referred to as selection phase and it lasts 40 rounds.
At the beginning of each round, subjects decide in which institution to play. After all subjects
have made their decision, each subject is randomly matched to another subject which has
chosen the same institution to form a pair. In case of an odd number of subjects in an
institution, one randomly chosen subject stays single and receives a fixed payoff of 3. Again,
in each pair, one subject is randomly chosen to be the sender, the other subject is the receiver.
After all subjects are informed about the selected institution and their role, the respective
game is played.
After each round subjects were informed about all decisions taken within the respective
pair, the resulting payoffs, and the individual accumulated payoff. Feedback on the identity
of the subject they were matched to was never given.
After the experiment, subjects were paid off privately in cash. The average payment to
the subjects was AC 16.23 with the average session lasting 105 minutes.
3 Results
In any sequential equilibrium for the standard assumptions of (expected) payoff maximizing
individuals and common belief of rationality, the sender tells the truth half of the time and
the receiver trusts half of the time in both institutions. Moreover, the receiver will never
choose to sanction and both players would weakly prefer the sanction-free institution (a
strict preference for the sanction-free institution could be due to the anticipation of some
“accidental” sanctioning). In the remainder of the paper, we will call truth-telling and trust
rates excessive if they exceed these standard equilibrium predictions. Moreover, standard
equilibrium predictions will serve as the Null-hypotheses for our tests if not stated otherwise.
This section is divided into four subsections, each of which is devoted to one of the deci-
sions: Sanctioning, institutional selection, truth-telling and trust. The first subsection reports
on observed sanctioning behavior throughout the experiment. In particular, we classify indi-
viduals by means of their sanctioning behavior. This allows us to study institutional selection,
truth-telling and trust separately for individuals with distinct sanctioning behavior.
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3.1 Sanctioning
Figure 2 illustrates the development of sanctioning behavior after the histories lie–trust and
truth–distrust over rounds (clustered per 5 rounds). Sanctioning after the other histories has
taken place only once for each history.
0%
100%
random assignment phase selection phase
◦ ◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
◦
◦
◦
◦ ◦•
• •
•
• • • •
• •
• •
•
• •
•
•
• •
•
Figure 2: Sanctioning rates after truth–distrust (circles) and lie–trust (bullets) over rounds (5-round
averages).
First of all, the occurrence of sanctioning (in both phases) is obviously in sharp contrast
to what standard theory predicts. Figure 2 also indicates that there is more sanctioning after
lie–trust than after truth–distrust, an observation that is confirmed by our statistical analysis
(the one-sided p-value of the corresponding Wilcoxon signed-rank test is 0.0072 for the random
assignment and 0.0173 for the selection phase). Moreover, we see that the transition to the
selection phase increases sanctioning after lie–trust (p = 0.0150, one-sided), but not after
truth–distrust (p = 0.3363, one-sided). The difference between the two trends narrows down
at the end of the experiment, but the sanctioning rate after the history truth–distrust over
the last ten rounds is there based on only 14 observations.
In our experiment, individuals take decisions in four different dimensions (neglecting
phases, institutions and histories): truth-telling, trust, sanctioning, and institutional choice.
Decisions regarding truth-telling, trust, and institutional selection can be driven by the in-
dividual’s preferences and their beliefs over action choices of the other individuals in the
respective institution. In contrast, the decision to sanction appears rather independent of
beliefs but a more straightforward expression of preferences. Therefore, we distinguish indi-
viduals according to their sanctioning behavior. Subjects with a sanctioning rate of more than
80% in the random assignment phase as a receiver after having trusted a lie by a sender are
classified as sanctioners, provided that the number of observations is at least 4. All subjects
that are not classified as sanctioners, are classified as others.9 Based on this procedure, 51
9A separate analysis of individuals who sanction after lie–trust and after truth–distrust (i.e., sanctioning
contingent on the payoff distribution) and of individuals who only sanction after lie–trust but not after truth–
distrust (i.e., sanctioning contingent on a specific history) is impossible due to the small number of observations
of the history truth–distrust. The requirement of at least four lie–trust observations may well lead to the
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out of the 160 participants in the experiment are classified as sanctioners.
Table 1 summarizes the average rates of sanctioning after lie–trust and truth–distrust in
the two different phases for three different groups of individuals: all, sanctioners, and others.
Moreover, this table presents the p-values of one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for differ-
lie–trust truth–distrust
random random
assignment selection assignment selection
phase phase phase phase
all 47% 64% 15% 15%
[0.0150] [0.3363]
sanctioners 95% 89% 19% 14%
[0.1468] [0.4276]
others 16% 32% 15% 17%
[0.0917] [0.5000]
Table 1: Average sanctioning rates after lie–trust and truth–distrust. Between squared brackets, the
p-values of a one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test on the difference in sanctioning between phases.
ences in sanctioning rates between the random assignment and the selection phase. Because
of the limited number of observations of the history truth–distrust in the selection phase,
the data does not allow for meaningful tests on sanctioning behavior after this history and,
therefore, the table only reports on the test results for sanctioning after lie–trust. However,
we can observe from simple inspection that the sanctioning rates after truth–distrust do not
change across phases. Most importantly, there is a significant increase in overall sanctioning,
but not for the two different groups of individuals.
Result 1 (Sanctioning). The sanctioning rate after lie–trust is higher than after truth–
distrust and selection increases the sanctioning rate after lie–trust.
3.2 Institutional Selection
The higher sanctioning rate after lie–trust in the selection phase (see Result 1) strongly
suggests that subjects with different attitudes towards sanctioning prefer different institutions.
Table 2 supports this interpretation. It can be seen that, in more than two-thirds of the cases,
individuals have selected the sanction-free institution. However, the sanctioners have chosen
the sanctioning institution in more than half of the cases, whereas the others selected this
institution in one out of five cases only. The sanctioning institution broke down (because no
pair of subjects opted for it) in only one out of eight sessions (the first one). The difference
between the rates by which sanctioners and others select the sanctioning institution is found
to be significant (p = 0.0072, one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
misidentification of sanctioners as others due to a lack of the history lie–trust for the respective individual.
Hence, the number of sanctioners may be underestimated in our analysis.
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sanction-free sanctioning
institution institution
all 68% 32%
sanctioners 48% 52%
others 80% 20%
Table 2: Institutional selection.
Result 2 (Institutional selection). Both institutions co-exist. Sanctioners choose more
often the sanctioning institution than the others.
3.3 Truth-telling
Figure 3 displays the development of the average rate of truth-telling during the sessions. The
0%
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Figure 3: Truth-telling in the sanction-free institution (circles) and in the sanctioning institution
(bullets) over rounds (5-round averages).
figure reveals that subjects tend to tell the truth excessively in both institutions and both
phases. Moreover, excessive truth-telling seems more prominent in the sanctioning institution
in the selection phase while the difference between the two institutions is less visible in the
random assignment phase. Finally, the opportunity to select an institution seems to (slightly)
increase the probability of truth-telling in the sanctioning institution, but has no obvious
impact in the sanction-free institution.
Table 3 summarizes average rates of truth-telling in both institutions and phases for the
three different groups of individuals and the p-values of the respective one-sided Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests on excessive truth-telling. In addition, the table displays the p-values of the
one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the difference between truth-telling rates in the two
phases.
Except for the sanctioning institution during the selection phase, we find significant excess
truth-telling on the overall population. If we leave out the session where the sanctioning
institution broke down, excess truth-telling in the sanctioning institution during the selection
10
sanction-free institution sanctioning institution
random random
assignment selection assignment selection
phase phase phase phase
all 54% 55% 58% 62%
(0.0209) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0708)
[0.2643] [0.4168]
sanctioners 64% 64% 74% 79%
(0.0072) (0.0212) (0.0072) (0.0212)
[0.4721] [0.1170]
others 49% 53% 51% 42%
(0.3121) (0.1170) (0.3121) (0.0537)
[0.0537] [0.0212]
difference 15% 11% 23% 37%
(0.0072) (0.0401) (0.0072) (0.0072)
Table 3: Average truth-telling rates for the overall population, the sanctioners and the others, and
the difference between the latter two sub-populations. Between brackets, we display the p-values of
the one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for excess truth-telling (first three rows) and the difference
in truth-telling between sanctioners and others (last row). Between squared brackets, we display the
p-values of the one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the difference in truth-telling between the two
phases.
phase becomes significant as well.10 Excess truth-telling is caused by the sanctioners, who in
both institution and phases told the truth excessively and significantly more often than the
others. Excess truth-telling among others is nowhere found to be significant. Moreover, the
data indicates that the others tend to lie excessively in the sanctioning institution throughout
the selection phase (p = 0.0537, one-sided).
Aggregate data reveals a significant difference in the truth-telling rates between the two
institutions. One-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on this data lead to a p-value of 0.0517
for the random assignment phase and a p-value of 0.1355 for the selection phase. With a
disregard of the first session, the latter p-value decreases to 0.0485.
On the overall level, the transition to the selection phase did not lead to a significant
change of the truth-telling rate. The only significant result is that the others start to tell the
truth less often in the sanctioning institution. For the sanction-free institution, the increase
in the truth-telling rate from the random assignment to the selection phase for the others is
significant with a p-value of 0.0537.
Result 3 (Truth-telling). There is more excessive truth-telling in the sanctioning institu-
tion than in the sanction-free institution in both phases. Sanctioners are responsible for the
excessive truth-telling everywhere. Institutional selection has no significant overall effect on
truth-telling, but leads to less truth-telling among the others in the sanctioning institution.
10In the first session (and only in this session), the sanctioning institution broke down. The insignificance is
caused by this session.
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3.4 Trust
Figure 4 displays the development of the average rate of trust during the sessions. In the
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Figure 4: Trust in the sanction-free institution (circles) and in the sanctioning institution (bullets)
over rounds (5-round averages).
sanctioning institution, receivers seem to trust excessively and there seems to be more trust
when the institution is element of choice. In the sanction-free institution, subjects seem to
trust excessively when randomly assigned to an institution. In the selection phase, however,
the average rate of trust seems to be in line with what standard theory predicts.
Table 4 summarizes all average rates of trust in both institutions and phases for the three
different groups of individuals and the p-values of the respective one-sided Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests on excessive trust. In addition, the table displays the p-values of the one-sided
sanction-free institution sanctioning institution
random random
assignment selection assignment selection
phase phase phase phase
all 56% 50% 73% 86%
(0.0071) (0.4721) (0.0072) (0.0072)
[0.0072] [0.0072]
sanctioners 55% 48% 89% 92%
(0.1180) (0.3999) (0.0072) (0.0072)
[0.0917] [0.4721]
others 56% 51% 65% 78%
(0.0536) (0.4232) (0.0072) (0.0072)
[0.0537] [0.0072]
difference −1% −3% 24% 14%
(0.3121) (0.2643) (0.0072) (0.0754)
Table 4: Average trust rates for the overall population, the sanctioners and the others, and the
difference between the latter two sub-populations. Between brackets, we display the p-values of the
one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for excess trust (first three rows) and the difference in trust
between sanctioners and others (last row). Between squared brackets, we display the p-values of the
one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the difference in trust between the two phases.
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Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the difference between trust rates in the two phases.
In the random assignment phase, we find excess trust in both institutions, whereas in the
selection phase, there is excess trust only in the sanctioning institution. In the sanctioning
institution, excess trust is caused by both types of individuals. Throughout the random
assignment phase, sanctioners trust significantly more often than the others. In general trust
rates seem to be higher in the sanctioning institution. Indeed, one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank
tests lead to a p-value of 0.0004 for both phases.
Finally, as for truth-telling, we close this subsection with an account of the difference
between average trust rates in the random assignment and the selection phase. We find that
trust increases for the sanctioning institution, but decreases for the sanction-free institution.
For both institutions these shifts are mainly caused by the others (though only significant
with a p-value of 0.0537 for the sanction-free institution). We summarize these results as
follows.
Result 4 (Trust). There is excessive trust in both institutions in the random assignment
phase and in the sanctioning institution in the selection phase. In both phases, there is more
trust in the sanctioning institution than in the sanction-free institution. For the two sub-
populations, excess trust is only found in the sanctioning institution. Sanctioners are only
found to trust significantly more than the others when randomly assigned to the sanctioning
institution. Institutional selection increases trust in the sanctioning institution and reduces
trust in the sanction-free institution.
4 Implications and explanations
In this section, we aim at theoretical explanations of our experimental findings. In particular,
we will investigate in how far observed behavior is in line with the hypothesis of payoff
maximization, social preferences, or explicit preferences for truth-telling.
In our experiment, we do not find convincing evidence to reject the hypothesis that sub-
jects classified as “others” are rational payoff-maximizers. Others do not tell the truth or
trust excessively—the only exceptions are excessive trust in the sanctioning institution and
the tendency to lie in the sanctioning institution during the selection phase. One is tempted
to explain these deviations as a response to excessive aggregate trust and truth-telling levels.
It should be kept in mind, however, that the best response of a rational, payoff-maximizing
subject to an aggregate trust-level of more than 50% is to tell the truth in 100% of the
cases (and likewise for a best-response to excessive truth-telling levels). Hence, our results
suggest that others fail to eventually learn aggregate truth-telling and trust rates and that
their behavior seems to reflect a (boundedly rational) learning process. More importantly,
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the others nearly sanction11 and their occasional choice of the sanctioning institution can well
be explained through the opportunity to free-ride on anticipated high truth-telling and trust
levels. Hence, the hypothesis that others are payoff maximizers cannot be rejected.
On the other hand, the behavior of “sanctioners” is in sharp contrast to the theoretical
predictions based on the assumption of payoff maximization. They (i) tell the truth excessively
(i.e., they report the true state of the world with more than 50%—but also in less than
100%—of the cases), (ii) sanction predominately after the history lie–trust, and (iii) choose
predominately the sanctioning institution. In what follows, we will investigate the predictive
power of models of distributional preferences (e.g., inequity aversion, maximin-preferences, or
preferences for efficiency) and deontological and consequentialistic preferences for truth-telling
in these respects.
4.1 Distributional preferences
As a benchmark, we start with a discussion of models of distributional preferences (e.g., util-
ity functions as proposed by Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000), or Charness and Rabin (2002))12 that can all be expressed by a utility function that
assigns to a given history of the game a utility that depends on the respective payoff dis-
tribution. A society of rational agents each of them endowed with such a (not necessarily
identical) utility function (and with common knowledge thereof) would lead to the following
sequential equilibrium behavior.13
(i) No information transmission. In any sequential equilibrium and independently of
the institution, senders tell the truth half of the time and receivers trust half of the time.
Hence, distributional preferences cannot explain excessive truth-telling and trust (in contrast
to Result 3 and 4). In fact, the best-response correspondences for distributional preferences
are identical to the payoff maximizing case.14
(ii) History-independent sanctioning. Receivers may sanction but their sanctioning be-
havior after histories that lead to the same payoff distribution is identical. This indicates
that distributional preferences allow for an explanation of sanctioning as such (see Result 1).
The reason is that receivers may prefer the material payoff distribution (0, 0) to (5, 1) if, e.g.,
11And, moreover, the sanctioning behavior of the others after the histories truth–distrust and lie–trust do
not differ (the one-sided p-value of the corresponding Wilcoxon signed-rank test is 0.3121 for the random
assignment and 0.1042 for the selection phase)
12For a recent overview of models of distributional preferences see e.g., Sobel (2005).
13For a detailed analysis see Subsection A.5.
14Extreme altruism of one player could of course support a sequential equilibrium with 100% truth-telling
and trust. However, to admit such a preference structure would make it difficult to explain sanctioning behavior
(by the same individuals).
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they are sufficiently inequity averse, spiteful, or negatively reciprocal.15 However, this implies
the same sanctioning behavior after the history lie–trust and truth–distrust in contrast to
Result 1.
(iii) Choice of the sanctioning institution. Agents may strictly prefer the sanctioning in-
stitution. In Appendix A (Proposition 2(iii)) we demonstrate that in a society with inequity
averse agents as proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), agents sanction after the histories
lie–trust and truth–distrust and they strictly prefer the sanctioning institution. However,
this explanation of institutional choice leaves the distinct truth-telling and trust levels across
institutions in the selection phase unexplained (see Results 3 and 4).
Hence, even though the assumption of distributional preferences is able to motivate sanction-
ing, it fails to explain excessive truth-telling or trust and the history dependence of sanctions.
To introduce history dependence, we continue with an explicit modelling of preferences for
truth-telling in the next two subsections.
4.2 Deontological preferences
From a deontological point of view, a lie is bad per se regardless of intentions or consequences.
This can be captured by a preference structure with psychological costs of lying for senders
and psychological costs of the exposition to a lie for receivers and respective psychological
benefits from truth-telling and the exposition to it. Clearly, this includes the extreme case of
individuals who are “programmed” to tell the truth. As we discuss in more detail in Subsec-
tion A.6, there are configurations of agents with deontological preferences (and with common
knowledge thereof) which lead to the following sequential equilibrium behavior.
(i) Information transmission. Senders always tell the truth and receivers always trust in
both institutions. This indicates that deontological preferences can explain excessive truth-
telling. However, it follows from Proposition 4(ii) and (iii) in Subsection A.6 that there are
no configurations of agents with deontological preferences such that senders tell the truth in
more than 50% of the cases and in less than 100% of the cases—which is what we observe
(see Result 3).
(ii) History-dependent sanctioning. Receivers sanction after and only after the history
lie–trust. This demonstrates that deontological preferences are able to explain history depen-
dent sanctioning behavior. However, the history lie–trust would never be on an equilibrium
path. Moreover, note that sanctioning after lie–trust and no sanctioning after lie–distrust is
15The reciprocity explanation has to be taken with care. According to recent reciprocity models such as
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) or Falk and Fischbacher (2006), receivers sanction in our setting if they
regard the sender’s action as unkind. In this respect, it is hard to imagine that receivers regard a lie as unkind
if it is the result of randomization by the sender. Therefore, the receiver’s psychological costs from a lie have
to depend on the beliefs about the sender’s actions. We report on a model along these lines in Subsection 4.3.
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not due to different psychological costs for the receiver but due to different material payoffs.
(iii) Choice of the sanctioning institution. Agents prefer the sanctioning institution
and the sanctioning institution is characterized by more truth-telling and trust compared to
the sanction-free institution. Hence, deontological preferences can explain the choice of the
sanctioning institution (due to higher truth-telling probability and a correspondingly higher
psychological payoff), but they fail to predict the exact pattern of truth-telling (between 50%
and 100%) and sanctions (on the equilibrium path).
In sum, deontological preferences are indeed able to explain the history-dependence of sanc-
tions and the choice of an institution that guarantees a higher level of truth-telling, but they
fail to explain truth-telling probabilities between 50% and 100%. This does not come as
a surprise. By assumption, deontological preferences ignore the consequences of a lie (e.g.,
psychological costs are identical after lie–trust and lie–distrust). The respective psychological
costs are therefore independent of the receiver’s choice. Hence, psychological benefits and
costs are just an offset to the receiver’s utility and do not alter the best-response correspon-
dence. But with an unaltered best-response for the receiver, the sender’s best response is
either to always tell the truth (if the corresponding benefits or the probability of a sanction
are sufficiently high), or to tell the truth with probability 50% (if psychological benefits and
the probability of a sanction are sufficiently low). As a next step, we therefore introduce
a consequentialistic notion of preferences which models a relationship between actions and
psychological costs.
4.3 Consequentialistic preferences
To model consequentialistic preferences for truth-telling, we assume that senders perceive
psychological benefits from telling the truth and suffer from a lie only if they believe that the
receiver expects them to be honest in more than 50% of the cases. In particular, the higher
the probability with which they expect the receiver to believe in their honesty, the higher the
psychological costs from lying and the psychological benefits from telling the truth. Whenever
senders expect receivers to believe in their honesty with a probability of 50% or less, however,
they do not perceive any psychological costs and benefits. Likewise, receivers perceive benefits
from truth-telling and suffer from a lie whenever they formed the belief that the sender tells
the truth in more than 50% of the cases. Again, psychological costs from lying and benefits
from telling the truth increase in the probability with which the receiver expects the sender
to tell the truth and psychological payoffs are zero whenever the anticipated probability of
truth-telling is less or equal to 50%. There are configurations of agents with such conse-
quentialistic preferences (and with common knowledge thereof) which lead to the following
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sequential equilibrium behavior.16
(i) Information transmission. Senders (receivers) tell the truth (trust) in more than 50%
and less than 100% of the cases. Hence, the fact that a receiver’s psychological payoff is no
longer independent of the actions (via the respective equilibrium beliefs), induces the exis-
tence of sequential equilibria with truth-telling probabilities between 50% and 100%.
(ii) History-dependent sanctioning. Receivers sanction after and only after the history
lie–trust. In particular, the absence of sanctions after lie–distrust is not only due to the higher
material payoffs (as for deontological preferences) but also driven by lower psychological costs.
(iii) Choice of the sanctioning institution. Agents strictly prefer the sanctioning institu-
tion and the sanctioning institution is characterized by more truth-telling and trust compared
to the sanction-free institution but also lower aggregate material payoff.
To summarize, distributional preferences fail to explain essential observations of our experi-
ment like the history-dependence of sanctions and excessive truth-telling, while the explicit
encounter of psychological costs of lying and benefits of truth-telling provide a coherent ex-
planation of the data. Overall, both ad hoc costs and benefits of a deontological preference
structure as well as belief-dependent costs and benefits of a consequentialistic model prove
to be powerful in this respect. We thereby regard consequentialistic modelling as in some
sense superior—it provides a more coherent explanation of the data and its description of
receiver behavior seems to have more intuitive appeal. A closer look at the nature of prefer-
ences for truth-telling (e.g., by eliciting the beliefs of the subjects or by introducing identical
costs of sanctions after lie–trust and lie–distrust)—though obviously suggested by our present
work—is nonetheless beyond the scope of the present paper.
5 Concluding remarks
For the last decade, one of the most active fields of research in experimental economics has
been the analysis of situations with unobservable or uncontractable actions.17 As a bottom
line, this research has shown that standard economic theory with rational, payoff maximizing
agents does a poor job in describing action choices for a given game or contract and the choice
of contracts. E.g., in experimental labor markets an agent’s effort choice tends to be increasing
in a fixed wage which is paid ex ante (see Fehr et al. (1993)), agents sanction certain actions
by other agents even if it reduces their own material payoff (see Gu¨th et al. (1982)), and some
agents deliberately choose institutions with the opportunity to sanction other agents’ action
16For a more detailed analysis see Subsection A.7.
17Consider for example labor-market experiments such as Fehr et al. (2006) or experiments on public good
provision such as Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000).
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choice even though these institutions lead to lower material payoffs (see Guererk et al. (2006)).
Inspired by these experimental findings, powerful theories of distributional preferences (see
Sobel (2005)), reciprocity (see Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2003) or Falk and Fischbacher
(2006)), and procedural justice (see Sen (1997) and Brandts and Charness (2003)) have been
developed to give a coherent explanation of the data. Our contribution helps to translate this
experimental and theoretical research from the field of unobservable or uncontractable actions
(moral hazard or incomplete contracts) to situations of unobservable types, i.e., problems
of adverse selection such as Akerlof (1970)’s market for lemons, monopolistic screening, or
signalling games. The following environment illustrates the connection.
Consider a seller (the sender) who is privately informed about the quality of a car (good
or bad) and a buyer (receiver) who only knows that the car is good and bad with 50%
probability. The seller sends a (not necessarily truthful) message about the quality of the car
and the receiver chooses one out of two contracts. Contract A (low price and no maintenance)
is optimal for the buyer if the car is good (payoff 5 for the receiver and 1 for the seller), while
contract B (high price and maintenance) is optimal for the buyer if the car is bad (again,
payoff 5 for the receiver and 1 for the seller). The combination good car and contract B
or bad car and contract A leads to a payoff distribution of 1 for the buyer and 5 for the
seller. Clearly, the unique sequential equilibrium (see Proposition 1 in Subsection A.4) yields
an expected payoff of 3 for seller and buyer (independent of the institution) and a market-
breakdown whenever the buyer’s reservation utility is above 3. Our experimental evidence
suggests that a market-breakdown is less likely due to excessive truth-telling. Moreover,
sanctioning opportunities lead to even higher truth-telling levels (and therefore fewer market-
breakdowns). As institutional selection enhances truth-telling in the sanctioning institution
while reducing it in the sanction-free institution, our experiment illustrates the importance of
self-selection of individuals with different preferences for truth-telling into distinct institutions.
In particular, it provides in a nutshell an example for the robust coexistence of different
institutional environments in a hidden-type setting.
From a theoretical perspective, our experiment demonstrates that preference structures
that have been developed to describe laboratory and field behavior in the case of moral hazard
and incomplete contracts are of limited descriptive power if it comes to settings with hidden
types. Only the explicit encounter of preferences for truth-telling allows for a coherent expla-
nation of the data. The existence of such preferences, however, has important implications
for the analysis of situations with hidden types. In particular, our paper suggest the existence
of an “intrinsic motivation to tell the truth” that comes along with the willingness to (costly)
punish lies. This relaxes the importance of truth-telling constraints that are a corner-stone of
any standard analysis of screening or signalling games and emphasizes the role of institutional
(self-)selection driven by non-profit motives.
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Finally, our findings suggest to model these preferences with great care. Deontological
preference structures that assign psychological costs to a lie and benefits to truth-telling
regardless of intentions and consequences (and in particular, models which assume that indi-
viduals are programmed to tell the truth) only provide an incomplete description of our data.
A consequentialistic model that accounts for psychological costs and benefits that depend
on beliefs (and thereby on intentions and consequences), however, can achieve a satisfactory
explanation of the data. This shows some similarity with the limits of models of distributional
preferences when explaining sanctioning behavior in settings with moral hazard or incomplete
contracts (see Falk et al. (2005)). Only the explicit consideration of intentions in models of
sequential reciprocity (see e.g. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2003)) draws a coherent picture.
In this sense, our experiment provides a nice illustration of the importance of dynamic psy-
chological games as a modelling structure that allows for an easy capture of belief-hierarchies
as a primitive of the agent’s utility function.
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A Theoretical analysis
In the following, we provide a detailed equilibrium analysis of the institutions introduced in
Section 2 with the preference notions discussed in Section 4. The analysis of distributional
and deontological preferences amounts to a straightforward exercise of sequential equilibrium
computation. In contrast, consequentialistic preferences require a more involved framework.
Here, the agent’s utility is a function that does not only depend on terminal histories and
material payoffs, but also on belief hierarchies (a second-order belief of the sender and a first-
order belief of the receiver). Such a payoff structure can be analyzed within the framework of
dynamic psychological games as introduced by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2006).18 In what
follows, we will provide a unified treatment of the preferences discussed in Section 4 within
this framework.
We start (Subsection A.1) with some additional notation that complements the presen-
tation of the two institutions in Section 2. In line with the analyzes in Section 3, we will
work with a reduced form of the sender-receiver game with actions of the sender and receiver
labelled as “truth-telling” and “trust”. We continue (Subsection A.2) with a general intro-
duction to the dynamic psychological game. Finally, after having presented three lemmas
(Subsection A.3) on best-response behavior regarding sanctioning, truth-telling and trust,
Subsections A.4–A.7 present the four preference structures and resulting propositions that
are referred to in Section 4.
18This paper, henceforth BD(2006), generalizes psychological games as introduced by Geanakoplos et al.
(1989), henceforth GPS(1989). While GPS(1989) allow the utility function of a player to depend on a hierarchy
of his own beliefs, BD(2006) admit utility functions that depend on hierarchies of beliefs of all players.
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A.1 Notation
As mentioned in the introductory text to this appendix we will consider the sender-receiver
game of Section 2 in its reduced form. Instead of considering the game as a dynamic game
of incomplete but perfect information, we will approach it as a dynamic game with complete
but imperfect information. This is done by considering the strategies of the players as meta-
strategies on the level of truth-telling and trust.
The reduced sender-receiver game consists therefore of a set of players N = {S,R} (Sender
and Receiver, generic element i) and for each player a set of pure strategies: AS = {t, l} (truth
and lie, generic element aS) and AR = {t, d} (trust and distrust, generic element aR). Mixed
strategies are a probability distributions over AS and AR, parameterized by σS and σR—the
probabilities to tell the truth and to trust, respectively. As all strategy spaces have cardinality
two, we can abbreviate −ai = Ai\{ai} and A−i = AN\i. A combination of strategies induces a
probability distribution over the set of histories H = {(t, t), (t, d), (l, t), (l, d)} (generic element
h) that are composed by the sender’s and the receiver’s pure strategies. Finally, the payoffs
xi(h) of player i for history h are given by
xS(h) =
{
1 if h = (t, t) or h = (l, d)
5 if h = (t, d) or h = (l, t)
and
xR(h) =
{
5 if h = (t, t) or h = (l, d)
1 if h = (t, d) or h = (l, t).
In the sanction-free institution, the players just played the sender-receiver game. For this
institution the set of terminal histories Z (generic element z) equals the set H and the payoffs
in these terminal histories are defined by xi(z) = xi(h) for i = S,R.
In the sanctioning institution, the receiver has an additional set of pure actions A′R =
{s, n} (sanction or not, generic element a′R). After having observed the history h, the receiver
decides to sanction or not. Therefore a pure sanctioning strategy is a mapping a′ : H → A′.
We denote a mixed sanctioning strategy by σ′R such that σ
′
R(h) denotes the probability that
the receiver sanctions in response to the history h. For this institution the set of terminal
histories Z (generic element z) equals the set {h×A′R |h ∈ H}. The payoffs in each terminal
history z = (h, a′R) are given by
xi(z) =
{
xi(h) if a′R = n
0 if a′R = s
for i = S,R. Let x(z) denote the distribution of material payoffs for a terminal history z.
A.2 Dynamic psychological games
Consider a set X, a Borel sigma-algebra B on X, and a collection of events C ⊆ B. A
conditional probability system (cps) on (X,B, C) is a function µ(·|·) : B × C → [0, 1] such
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that (i) µ(·|F ) is a probability measure over X for every F ∈ C, (ii) µ(F |F ) = 1, and (iii)
E ⊆ F ′ ⊆ F implies µ(E|F ) = µ(E|F ′)µ(F ′|F ) for all E ∈ B and F, F ′ ∈ C.
Define for every player i and k = 0, 1, 2, . . . the set Xk−i recursively as follows. X
0
−i = A−i
and Xk−i = X
k−1
−i × ∆H(Xk−1−i ) where ∆H(X) denotes the set of all cps for X for a given
set of histories H. A cps µki ∈ ∆H(Xk−1−i ) is called a kth order cps. A hierarchy of cps for
player i is a countably infinite sequence of cps’ µi = (µ1i , µ
2
i , . . .). A hierarchy is coherent if
the cps of distinct orders assign the same conditional probabilities to lower-order events. A
hierarchy is collectively coherent if each of its cps assigns probability one to the coherence of
the hierarchy of the other players. We denote the set of collectively coherent hierarchies for
player i by Mi and Si∈NMi ≡M (generic element µ).
A dynamic psychological game is a structure Γ = (N,H, (ui)i∈N ) where
ui : Z ×M ×A−i → R (1)
is player i’s psychological payoff function. So, psychological payoffs are defined on the set
of terminal histories (Z) and on player −i’s strategy space. Moreover, psychological payoffs
may depend on elements of M , e.g., the sender’s psychological payoff may depend on her
second-order cps µ2S—i.e., on her belief on the receiver’s belief in truth-telling—and thereby
introducing a cost for the sender to “fool” a receiver who believes in her honesty.
The primitive for the equilibrium analysis are behavior strategies denoted by σi. The
sender’s behavior strategy is fully determined by σS , the receiver’s behavior strategy in the
sanction-free institution is fully determined by σR and in the sanctioning institution by the
pair (σR, σ′R).
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An assessment for player i is a pair (σi, µi) where σi is a behavior strategy and µi is a
hierarchy of cps’ for player i. In the two player case such an assessment is called consistent if
first-order cps’ are stochastically independent and a player’s higher-order beliefs in µ assigns
probability one to the respective lower-order beliefs in µ.20 An assessment profile (σi, µi)i∈N
will be denoted by (σ, µ).
Let us denote the expected utility for player i with psychological payoff function ui from
choosing pure strategy ai for a consistent belief hierarchy µ by Eµ[ui|ai] and denote the
expected utility from a behavior strategy profile σ by Eµ[ui|σ]. An assessment profile (σ, µ)
is a sequential equilibrium (SE) if it is consistent and
Supp (σi) ⊆ argmax
ai∈Ai
Eµ[ui|ai].
We denote the set of sequential equilibria of a dynamic psychological game Γ by SE(Γ).
19Following BD(2006), we interpret a mixed strategy σi of player i as the common (first-order)-belief of the
other player(s) about the strategy choice of i (see Aumann and Branderburger (1995)).
20For more than 2 players consistency additionally requires the coincidence of first-order beliefs of any two
players about a third player’s strategies (see Assumption 6 in BD(2006)).
23
The following result guarantees the existence of a sequential equilibrium in a dynamic
psychological game.
Theorem 1. Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2006) For any dynamic psychological game Γ
a sequential equilibrium exists (SE(Γ) 6= ∅).
The psychological payoff function ui : Z ×M × A−i → R is flexible enough to capture all
preference structures discussed in Section 4. For the sake of simplicity and following the main
contributions to the literature on non-standard preferences (see Sobel (2005)), we restrict our-
selves to risk-neutral players and (in case of deontological and consequentialistic preferences)
to an additively separable structure of material and psychological payoffs. Furthermore, we
adopt as a convention that a player’s utility in case of sanctioning is zero. Relaxing these as-
sumptions does not alter the main conclusions regarding the descriptive power of the different
preference structures expressed in Section 4 but drives the analysis much more cumbersome.
Finally, we exclude extreme forms of altruism (such that players strictly prefer a payoff dis-
tribution of 1 for themselves and 5 for the other player) and summarize as follows.
Assumption 1. (i) Consider the sanctioning institution and let a′R = s. Then ui(z, µ) = 0
for all i. (ii) Fix µ, let x(z) = (5, 1) and x(z′) = (1, 5). Then, uS(z, µ) > uS(z′, µ) and
uR(z, µ) < uR(z′, µ).
A.3 Three lemmas
We first analyze the receiver’s optimal sanctioning decision (in the sanctioning institution)
and thereby adopt the convention that the receiver sanctions (a′R(h) = s) if and only if he is
strictly better off by doing so.
Lemma 1. Fix a belief hierarchy µ and a history h = (aS , aR). Then, σ′R(h) = 1 if and only
if 0 = uR((h, s), µ) > uR((h, n), µ) and σ′R(h) = 0 otherwise in any sequential equilibrium.
Proof. Obvious.
Lemma 1 implies that only a pure action at the punishment stage can be part of an equilib-
rium. We will refer to this action as a∗R.
To elicit the best response correspondences for the receiver and the sender in the sender-
receiver game, we henceforth assume that the receiver indeed chooses a∗R in the sanctioning
stage (of the sanctioning institution). The following lemma fully determines the best response
correspondence of the receiver.21
21For expositional ease we suppress a∗R and µ as arguments of the psychological payoff function from now on.
Hence, we continue with ui(aS , aR). Moreover, we slightly abuse notation and denote by µ
1
R(S) the probability
with which the receiver (sender) believes the sender (receiver) to tell the truth (trust), i.e., µ1i denotes player
i’s first-order belief on σ−i.
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Lemma 2. Let ui(·) satisfy Assumption 1. The best response of the receiver is given by
σR =

1 if µ1R > µ¯R
[0, 1] if µ1R = µ¯R
0 if µ1R < µ¯R
with
µ¯R =
uR(l, d)− uR(l, t)
uR(l, d)− uR(l, t) + uR(t, t)− uR(t, d) .
Proof. The receiver’s best response correspondence results from the following maximization
program.
max
σR∈[0,1]
µ1R (σRuR(t, t) + (1− σR)uR(t, d)) + (1− µ1R) (σRuR(l, t) + (1− σR)uR(l, d))
which is equivalent to the problem
max
σR∈[0,1]
σR(µ1R (uR(t, t)− uR(t, d)) + (1− µ1R) (uR(l, t)− uR(l, d))) + C1 (2)
where C1 is a constant that does not depend on σR. Any feasible σR solves this latter problem
if µ1R = µ¯R (as defined in the lemma). If µ
1
R > µ¯R, (2) is solved by σR = 1; and, if µ
1
R < µ¯R,
(2) is solved by σR = 0.
Analogously, the sender’s best response correspondence is determined as follows.
Lemma 3. Let ui(·) satisfy Assumption 1. The best response of the sender is given by
σS =

1 if µ1S < µ¯S
[0, 1] if µ1S = µ¯S
0 if µ1S > µ¯S
with
µ¯S =
uS(l, d)− uS(t, d)
uS(l, d)− uS(l, t) + uS(t, t)− uS(t, d) .
Proof. The sender’s best response correspondence results from the following maximization
program.
max
σS
σS
(
µ1SuS(t, t) + (1− µ1S)uS(t, d)
)
+ (1− σS)
(
µ1SuS(l, t) + (1− µ1S)uS(l, d)
)
which is equivalent to the problem
max
σS
σS [µ1S(uS(t, t)− uS(l, t)) + (1− µ1S)(uS(t, d)− uS(l, d))] + C2 (3)
where C2 is a constant that does not depend on σS . Any feasible σS solves this problem if
µ1S = µ¯S (as defined in the lemma). If µ
1
S > µ¯S , (3) is solved by σS = 0; and, if µ
1
S < µ¯S , (3)
is solved by σS = 1.
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A.4 Payoff maximization
In the case of payoff maximization, the player’s utility coincides with his individual (material)
payoff. This is a special case of the psychological payoff function in (1)—the player’s utility
only depends on the terminal node z ∈ Z, and the player’s individual payoff in this terminal
node.22
Assumption 2. Let xi(z) be player i’s material payoff for a terminal history z. Then, player
i’s utility for z is given by ui(z) = xi(z).
This assumption leads to the benchmark result discussed at the beginning of Section 3 (for a
proof see e.g., Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz (forthcoming)).
Proposition 1. Let ui(·) satisfy Assumption 1 and 2.
(i) In the sanctioning institution, in any SE, σ′R(h) = 0 for all h ∈ H.
(ii) In both institutions, in any SE, σS = σR = 12 .
(iii) Players weakly prefer the sanction-free institution.
A.5 Distributional preferences
For distributional preferences, we assume that a player’s utility is a continuous function of
the payoff-distribution in a terminal node and formalize as follows.
Assumption 3. Player i’s utility for z is given by
ui(z) = fi(x(z)).
Proposition 2. Let ui(·) satisfy Assumption 1 and 3.
(i) Let h, h′ ∈ H and suppose x(h) = x(h′). Then, σ′R(h) = σ′R(h′) in any SE (in the
sanctioning institution). Suppose that uR(h) < 0, then σ′R(h) = 1 in any SE.
(ii) In both institutions, in any SE, σS = σR = 12 .
(iii) Suppose ui(z) = xi(z)− κmax (x−i(z)− xi(z), 0)− λmax (xi(z)− x−i(z), 0) for all i ∈
{S,R} with κ = 2 and λ = 0.6.23 Then, σ′R(h) = 0 if x(h) = (1, 5) and σ′P (h) = 1 if
x(h) = (5, 1). Moreover, players prefer the sanctioning institution.
22Recall that, throughout this appendix, z refers to both institutions simultaneously and that z = h for the
sanction-free institution and z = (h, a′R) for the sanctioning institution.
23Model and specification taken from Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
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Proof. (i) With Assumption 3, x(h) = x(h′) implies uR(h) = uR(h′). But then Lemma 1
indicates that σ′R(h) = σ
′
R(h
′) in any SE.
(ii) From Assumption 3 and Part (i) it follows that uR(t, t) = uR(l, d) and uR(l, t) =
uR(t, d). This implies by Lemma 2 that µ¯R = 12 which fixes the receiver’s best response
correspondence. Now suppose in contradiction to the proposition that µ1R 6= 12 and let without
loss of generality be µ1R >
1
2 . Then, Lemma 2 indicates that σR = 1. But then µ
1
S = 1 and
Lemma 3 imply that the sender’s best response is σS = 0. But σS = 0 contradicts µ1R >
1
2 .
µ1S =
1
2 follows analogously.
(iii) Suppose ui(z) = xi(z) − κmax (x−i(z)− xi(z), 0) − λmax (xi(z)− x−i(z), 0) for all
i ∈ {S,R} with κ = 2 and λ = 0.6. Then, uR(t, t) = uR(l, d) = 5 − 0.6 · 4 = 3.6 and
uR(l, t) = uR(t, d) = 1 − 2 · 4 = −7. Hence, σ′R(h) = 1 if x(h) = (5, 1) and σ′R(h) = 0 if
x(h) = (1, 5). Given Part (ii), the sender’s and receiver’s expected utility in the sanction-free
institutions is 123.6− 127 = −1.7. In the sanctioning institution, the sender’s expected utility
is 120− 127 = −3.5 and the receiver’s expected utility is 123.6− 120 = 1.8. Hence, with random
assignment of the role of a sender and a receiver, each player expects a utility of −0.85 > −1.7
and therefore opts for the sanctioning institution.
A.6 Deontological preferences
For deontological preferences, we assume that players regard lying as per se bad and therefore
incur psychological costs from lying and being exposed to a lie, respectively. A player’s utility
therefore depends on her/his material payoff and the strategy of the sender as follows.
Assumption 4. Let xi(z) be player i’s payoff for a terminal history z. Then, player i’s
utility for z is given by
ui(z) = xi(z) + gi(z)
with gi(h) = c+i > 0 if aS = t and gi(h) = c
−
i < 0 if aS = l. For the sanction-free institution
gi(z) = gi(h) and for the sanctioning institution gi(z) = gi(h) if a′R = n and gi(z) = 0 if
a′R = s.
Proposition 3. Let ui(·) satisfy Assumption 1 and 4.
(i) Suppose aS = t, then σ′R(h) = 0. Suppose that aS = l and xR(h) < |c−R|, then σ′R(h) = 1.
(ii) Consider the sanctioning institution and suppose that |c−R| ∈ (1, 5). Then in any SE,
σS = σR = 1, and σ′R(h) = 1 for h = (l, t) and σ
′
R(h) = 0 otherwise.
(iii) Consider the sanction-free institution and suppose that c+S − c−S < 4. Then, σS = 12 and
σR ∈ (12 , 1) in any SE. Suppose c+S − c−S ≥ 4. Then, σS = σR = 1 in any SE.
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(iv) Suppose c+S = c
+
R = 0 and c
−
S = c
−
R = 2. Then, players strictly prefer the sanctioning
institution.
Proof. (i) Follows from Assumption 4 and Lemma 1.
(ii) With Assumption 4 and Lemma 1 it follows that σ′R(h) = 1 if xR(h) + gR(h) < 0
and σ′R(h) = 0 otherwise. Then, |c−i | ∈ (1, 5) implies uS(h) = 0 for h = (l, t), and Lemma 3
implies that σS = 1 is the best response for the sender (independent of µ1S). The respective
unique best response of the receiver is σR = 1 (see Lemma 2).
(iii) With Assumption 4 it follows that uR(l, d)−uR(l, t) = uR(t, t)−uR(t, d). This implies
(by Lemma 2) that µ¯R = 12 which fixes the receiver’s best response correspondence. Moreover
(see Lemma 3), µ¯S = 12 +
1
8(c
+
S − c−S ). For c+S − c−S < 4, this implies µ¯S ∈ (12 , 1) which fixes
the sender’s best response correspondence and implies the first part of the result. Finally,
suppose c+S − c−S ≥ 4. Then, the sender’s best response is σS = 1 (see Lemma 3) such that
µ1R = 1 and the receiver’s best response becomes σR = 1 (see Lemma 2).
(iv) With c−R = 2, Part (ii) implies that σ
′
R(l, t) = 1 and σ
′
R(h) = 0 for all other h ∈ H.
Moreover, σR = σS = 1 in any SE. Hence, the sender’s expected utility in the sanctioning
institution is uS(t, t) = 1 and the receiver’s expected utility is uR(t, t) = 5 (recall that
c+S = c
+
R = 0). Hence, random assignment induces an expected payoff of 3 from the sanctioning
institution. For the sanction-free institution, c+i + |c−i | = 2 induces µ1R = 12 and µ1S = 34 (see
Part (iii)). This yields an expected utility for the sender and receiver of 2. Hence, they both
prefer the sanctioning institution.
A.7 Consequentialistic preferences
For consequentialistic preferences, we denote by α the sender’s (second-order) belief about
the receiver’s belief on σS (the probability of truth-telling). And we denote by β = µ1R the
receiver’s first-order belief about σS . A player’s utility now depends on her/his material payoff
and the elements of belief-hierarchies α and β as follows.
Assumption 5. Let xi(z) be player i’s payoff for a terminal history z. Then, the sender’s
utility for z and α is given by
uS(z, α) = xS(z) + gS(z, α)
with gS(h, α) continuous,
∂gS(h,α)
∂α > 0 if aS = t, aR = t, and α >
1
2 ,
∂gS(h,α)
∂α < 0 if aS = l,
aR = t, and α > 12 , and gS(h, α) = 0 otherwise. The receiver’s utility for z and β is given by
uR(z, β) = xR(z) + gR(z, β)
with gR(h, β) continuous,
∂gR(h,β)
∂β > 0 if aS = t, aR = t, and β >
1
2 ,
∂gR(h,β)
∂β < 0 if
aS = l, aR = t, and β > 12 , and gR(h, β) = 0 otherwise. For the sanction-free institution
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gi(z, ·) = gi(h, ·) and for the sanctioning institution gi(z, ·) = gi(h, ·) if a′R = n and gi(z, ·) = 0
if a′R = s.
Proposition 4. Let ui(z, µ) satisfy Assumption 1 and 5.
(i) There is always a SE with σR = σS = 12 in the sanction-free institution and there
is always a SE with σS = σR = 12 and σ
′
R(h) = 0 for all h ∈ H in the sanctioning
institution.
(ii) Consider the sanctioning institution and suppose that |gR((l, t), 1)| ∈ (1, 5). Then there
is a SE with σR = σS = 1, σ′R(z) = 1 for h = (l, t) and σ
′
R = 0 otherwise.
(iii) Consider the sanction-free institution and suppose that |gS((t, t), α)| < |gS((l, t), α)|
for any α > 12 and |gR((t, t), β)| < |gR((l, t), β)| for any β > 12 . Moreover, suppose
|gS((t, t), 1)|+ |gS((l, t), 1)| < 4. Then, there is a SE with σR ∈ (12 , 1) and σS ∈ (12 , 1).
(iv) Suppose that gi((t, t), 611) = 1 and gi((l, t),
6
11) = −2. Then, players prefer the sanction-
ing institution.
Proof. (i) For a belief-system with µ1S = µ
1
R =
1
2 (and therefore α = β =
1
2), Assumption 5
implies that the player’s utility is given by their material payoff xi(z). Hence, it follows
analogously to Proposition 1 that µ1S = µ
1
R =
1
2 indeed constitutes a SE.
(ii) With Assumption 5 and Lemma 1 it follows that σ′R(h) = 1 if |gR(h, α)| > xR(h) and
σ′R = 0 if |gR(h, α)| ≤ xR(h). Then, |gR(h, α)| ∈ (1, 5) implies uS(h) = 0 for h = (l, t), and
Lemma 3 implies that σS = 1 is the best response for the sender (independent of µ1S). The
respective best response of the receiver is σR = 1 (see Lemma 2) consistent with α = β = 1.
(iii) With the |gS((t, t), α)| < |gS((l, t), α)| for any α > 12 , |gR((t, t), β)| < |gR((l, t), β)| for
any β > 12 , and |gS((t, t), 1)| + |gS((l, t), 1)| < 4, it follows that µ¯S ∈ (12 , 1) and µ¯R ∈ (12 , 1).
Then, the result follows analogously to the proof of Proposition 1 (for details see e.g., the
Appendix in Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz (forthcoming)).
(iv) Obviously, player’s are indifferent between both institutions if players coordinate on
the equilibrium characterized in Part(i). Assume from now on that players coordinate on
the equilibria characterized in Part (ii) and (iii), respectively. With gi((t, t), 611) = 1 and
gi((l, t), 611) = −2, Part (ii) implies an expected utility for the sender lager than uS(t, t) = 2
(recall that gi(h, ·) is monotone increasing in α and β, respectively) and for the receiver larger
than uR(t, t) = 6. Hence, random assignment induces an expected payoff of at least 4 from
the sanctioning institution. For the sanction-free institution institution, gi((t, t), 611) = 1 and
gi((l, t), 611) = −2 induces µ¯R = 611 and µ¯S = 45 . This yields an expected utility for the sender
of 6355 and the receiver of
235
55 . Hence, random assignment induces an expected payoff of
149
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which is less than 2.71 and therefore does not outperform the sanctioning institution. Hence,
both players prefer the sanctioning institution.
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B Instructions
Welcome
Dear participant,
thank you for taking part in this experiment! It will last about 2 hours. You will be com-
pensated according to your performance during the experiment. In order to ensure that the
experiment takes place in an optimal setting, we would like to ask you to follow the general
rules during the whole experiment:
• please do not communicate with your fellow students!
• please do not forget to switch off your mobile phone!
• read the instructions carefully. If something is not well explained or any question turns
up now or at any time later in the experiment, then ask one of the experimenters. Do,
however, not ask out loud, but raise your hand! We will clarify questions privately.
• you may take notes on this instruction sheet if you wish.
• after the experiment, please remain seated till we paid you off.
• if you do not obey the rules, the data becomes useless for us. Therefore we will have to
exclude you from this experiment and you will not receive any compensation.
Your decisions are anonymous. None of your fellow students nor anybody else will ever learn
them from us.
Environment 1
The central situation of the experiment is the situation depicted in Figure 5 with the following
underlying story.
A B
1 ; 5 5 ; 1
Table A
A B
5 ; 1 1 ; 5
Table B
Figure 5: Central situation of the experiment
There are two players, a sender and a receiver. In the beginning, the computer randomly
selects one of the payoff tables A and B, each with equal probability. Only the sender will
be (correctly) informed which table has been selected. Next, the sender transmits either
the message “Table A has been selected” or the message “Table B has been selected” to the
receiver. Please, observe that the sender can transmit whatever message he prefers. After
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observing the sender’s message, the receiver decides whether to take action A (that is to
select column A) or to take action B (that is to select column B). The interpretation of the
actions is that the receiver says either I believe the actual payoff table is A or I believe the
actual payoff table is B. The payoffs to the sender and the receiver, which are given by the
numbers in the corresponding cell, depend only on the table actually chosen by the computer
and the action selected by the receiver. The first number in the cell corresponds to the payoff
of the sender, the second number to the payoff of the receiver. In short, if the receiver’s action
matches with the actual table she receives 5 ECU (Experimental Currency Units) and the
sender 1 ECU. Otherwise, payoffs are the opposite. For example, if the computer chooses
table A, the tells the receiver that table A has been selected, and the receiver takes action A,
then the sender gets 1 ECU and the receiver 5 ECU.
Environment 2
The second environment extends the first environment. After receiving feedback on the table
chosen by the computer and the decisions of the sender and the receiver, the receiver has to
make a final decision. She has to decide whether to accept the payoffs for both participants
or whether to reduce the payoff of both participants to zero.
Matching
This experimental session consists of 100 rounds. In total, 20 subjects participate in this
experiment. In every of the first 60 rounds, the computer assigns you randomly to one of the
two environments. With 70% probability you will be assigned to the second environment.
Next, you are randomly matched with another participant from the same environment to form
a pair. In each pair, one participant is randomly chosen to be the sender, and one to be the
receiver. This process is random. Your profile may change every round with respect to three
variables: the environment you are assigned to (1 or 2), the participant you are matched with
(some subject from the same environment), and the role you have (sender or receiver). The
matching is anonymous, so you will never learn with whom you formed a pair. After every
round you receive a complete feedback of the decisions of both players, the payoffs from the
round, and your accumulate payoff.
In the second phase of the experiment, the last 40 rounds, you can decide whether you want
to be in environment 1 or in environment 2. This decision is taken every round anew. Given
your decision for the current round, you are again randomly matched with another participant
from the same environment to form a pair. In each pair, one participant is randomly chosen
to be the sender, and one to be the receiver. Observe that if an odd number of participants
choose an environment it becomes impossible to divide all players into pairs. In this situation,
the participant that stays single does not have to make decisions and gets a fixed payoff of
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3 ECU. The matching is anonymous, so you will never learn with whom you formed a pair.
After every round you receive a complete feedback of the decisions of both players, the payoffs
from the round, and your accumulate payoff.
Payment
The points that you accumulate in course of the experiment will determine your payment.
The exchange rate ECU/Euros is such that every ECU in the experiments is equal to 5
Eurocents.
Closing
At the end of the experiment, we would like to ask you to complete a short on-screen ques-
tionnaire. But, before we start, we would like to ask you to answer the control questions on
the bottom of this page. Once ready, please raise your hand, and one of the experimenters will
check your answers. The software will be started as soon as all answers have been checked.
So, please, be patient.
Thank you again and good luck with the experiment! And, please, make your decisions
carefully—your reward depends on your performance during the experiment.
Control questions
Please, answer the following questions! One of the experimenters will go round, check the
answers and discuss any problems.
Please fill in your subject id:
Statement True False
In the 43th round of the experiment, I will be able to select my favorite
environment.
If I am playing the role of sender this round, I can be sure to be playing
the role as receiver next round.
I never know whom of the other participants I am matched with.
As a sender I can be sure that the receiver regards my message as
credible.
In the second environment, before making the decision of whether
or not to reduce the payoffs of both participants, I am informed about the
selected table and the payoffs resulting from my choice as a receiver.
My decisions in the first phase do not influence my payoffs.
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